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III.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendant asserts that she "submitted the Affidavit of Jim
Lancaster and Supplemental Affidavit of Jim Lancaster in support of
her motion."

See Appelleefs Br., p. 4.

Defendant, then, accuses

plaintiff of submitting an affidavit of her own at the eleventh
hour, and of attempting to argue that the release is ambiguous. See
Appellee's Br., p. 4.

Defendant actually submitted Lancaster's

supplemental affidavit with her reply brief below, not her original
motion (R. 40-49).

Defendant argued in her reply, for the first

time, that the "Release . . . [was] intended to apply to [her]" (R.
45), as opposed to her husband.

Plaintiff filed her affidavit in

response to this new evidence and new argument. Plaintiff did not
argue that the release was ambiguous.

She noted that Lancaster's

supplemental affidavit was extrinsic evidence which implicated that
issue.

As defendant's counsel stated at oral argument:
[T]he reason for the affidavit in the first
place was that the [defendant's] reply
memorandum included a supplemental affidavit
from Jim Lancaster, which up to that time had
not mentioned any thing about the intent of
the parties. . . . I would agree with counsel
here that the release document speaks for
itself, and you could bring in affidavits to
say, well, I intended to do this or that. But
we have exactly what the documents say, and
unless it's ambiguous, the [sic] it's not in
issue. And I don't think [it] is ambiguous.

6/21/96 Tr., p. 10.

1

This sequence is critical to understanding how the issue of
ambiguity and the extrinsic evidence fit into the arguments made
before this Court. Plaintiff is not asserting that the release is
ambiguous, or attempting to introduce extrinsic evidence in order
to reform the release. She is responding to defendant's attempt to
inject extrinsic evidence without adhering to the prescribed
analytical process (i.e., that finding an ambiguity is a prerequisite to considering extrinsic evidence).
IV.
ARGUMENT
Defendant had two mutually exclusive alternatives for meeting
her burden of proving the affirmative defense of release.

See

Krauss v. Utah State Dept. of Transportation, 852 P.2d 1014, 1023
(Utah App. 1993) (party not named in release must prove that it is
discharged).

She could show that she was discharged under the

terms of the release, but only without relying upon any extrinsic
evidence. Alternatively, she could offer extrinsic evidence of
intent, bvxt only if the release is in some way ambiguous.

In that

event, Ms. Thornock's affidavit disputes defendant's evidence, and
summary judgment is still improper.

2

(A)
UMDER SECTION 78-27-42, DEFENDANT CANNOT
BE DISCHARGED BY THE RELEASE
1.

Section 78-27-42 is Controlling Here,
Defendant argues, that § 78-27-42, U.C.A, applies only to

"multiple tortfeasor situation[s]" and, that this is not such a
situation. See Appellee's Br., p. 14. Defendant also contends that
her husband is not a "defendant," as defined in § 78-27-37, U.C.A.
Thus, according to defendant, the traditional common-law rules
apply, under which a general release discharges anyone involved.
See Appellee's Br., pp. 17-19.
Defendant's argument proves too much. The common-law rule, to
which

she seeks to return, provides that the release of a

tortfeasor discharges other joint tortfeasors. See Catmull v.
Medical Integrated Systems, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 334, 336-37, 517 P.2d
1023 (1974).

Mr. Jensen is, by defendant's reasoning, no more a

"tortfeasor" than he is a "defendant."
which

Thus, the very premise

Defendant would use to remove § 78-27-42, necessarily

precludes applying the common-law rule.

If defendant's reasoning

is correct, the common-law does not apply either because it applies
only to joint tortfeasors.
unnecessary —

Such semantic maneuvering is, in fact,

except, perhaps to illustrate the contradiction in

defendant's position.

The better approach is to acknowledge that

§ 78-27-42 does apply here.

3

Mr. Jensen is a "defendant," for purposes of this release,
precisely because he is named in it. Defendant's original position
below necessarily
releasee.

assumes, that Mr. Jensen was the intended

As noted, defendant did not offer extrinsic evidence

purporting to show that she was the intended releasee, until after
plaintiff raised § 78-27-42.
was an additional releasee.

Instead, defendant argued that she
That implies that there is a proper

named releasee -- Mr* Jensen. Defendant simply cannot rely upon a
document, which on its face releases claims against Mr. Jensen,
then argue that there are no such claims.

By offering a release

naming her husband, defendant has necessarily adraitted that he i&
a "defendant."
Moreover, the term "defendant" should be construed liberally,
not technically.

£s originally enacted, § 78-27-42 used the term

"tortfeasor," instead of "defendant."

.See Krukiewicz v. Draperf

725 P-2d 1349, 1350 (Utah 1986). "Tortfeasor" was defined in terms
of actual liability — not claimed liability, as "defendant" is in
the present version of the statutes.

Id.

In Krukiewicz, the

plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident by an employee of
the defendant.

Plaintiff released the employee, whereupon the

defendant claimed to bk discharged as well, notwithstanding § 7827-42. The defendant made an argument similar to the one made here
-- that the statute did not apply because he was not "a joint
tortfeasor."

The court

rejected

4

that argument, although an

employer is technically not a joint tortfeasor.

See 728 P«2d at

1352.
Krukiewicz
interpretted

shows

that

the

term

"defendant"

liberally, rather than technically.

should

be

Indeed, by

changing from the term "tortfeasor" (defined by actual liability)
to the term "defendant" (defined by potential liability), the
legislature has moved in a more liberal, less technical direction.
Krukiewicz also contradicts defendant's theory that the narrow
purpose of § 78-27-42 is to carve out an exception to the common
law for a very specific and limited class of cases. It clearly has
a broader purpose — to serve as a sort of parol evidence rule for
releases,

under

which

an unnamed

party

cannot

claim

to be

discharged.
Section § 78-27-42 furthers that purpose by substituting a
clear and certain rule for the relative uncertainties of the
common-law approach. Under § 78-27-42, the scope of a release does
not depend upon the nuances of the underlying case, but upon what
the release says.

Assessing the releasee's relative actual fault

would undermine that process and purpose.

As a practical matter,

that is also a difficult inquiry. Holding that a party named in the
release is a "defendant," is a more clear and certain rule.

It is

more consistent with the broad remedial purpose of § 78-27-42 to
preclude a party not named in a release from asserting the release
as a defense.

S

2.

Defendant is not Sufficiently Described in the Release with a
Sufficient Degree of Specificity,
Defendant claims to be discharged, even if § 78-27-42 applies,

pursuant to language referring to Lowell Jensen's "heirs" or by
general references to any liable parties. The first contention is
not only inconsistent with the preclusion against relying upon
"boilerplate" see Child v, Newsome, 892 P.2d 9 (Utah 1995), but
also with the terms of the release itself, Ms, Jensen's liability
here is not as an "heir" of her husband, but as an active
tortfeasor. See e.g,, Gordon v, CRS Consulting Engineers, I n c .
820 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah App. 1991),

Defendant's second contention

is squarely precluded by Child, wherein the release, which was held
to be insufficient, contained an identical reference to "all other
persons, firms and corporations."

892 P. 2d at 11*

Defendant

cannot argue that such language, which was rejected in Child, describes her here with a sufficient "degree of specificity,"

Id,

The clear holding in Child is that boilerplate language, such as
defendant seeks to rely upon here, is ineffective to expand the
scope of a release beyond the named party.
The Court, in Chi Id, adopted what is regarded as the strict
construction
provides,"

of

the statutory

phrase

"unless the release so

892 P.2d at 11 (phrase "must be construed narrowly

. . . [to avoid controverting] the statute's purpose by allowing
general

release

tortfeasor")•

language . . • to

discharge

[a

non-named]

Many jurisdictions, which have adopted a similar
6

version of the model act, continue to allow non-parties to a
release to rely upon broad, general language. Utah does not. See
6 A.L.R.5th 883, § 7, Supplement at p. 27.

That annotation

classifies Utah, based upon Child, as a proponent of the strict
view, under which general language is completely ineffective. Id.
Whatever "describing a party with some degree of specificity"
means, it cannot include "boilerplate language."

See 892 P.2d at

ll.1
Defendant's belated third-party beneficiary argument is also
foreclosed by Child and § 78-27-42. See Appellee's Br., pp. 20-22.
Defendant has no evidence that she was an intended third-party
beneficiary, other than the boilerplate language of the release
which is insufficient as a matter of law. See Child, 892 P. 2d at
11.

Defendant's extrinsic evidence of intent does not support the

view that she was an intended third-party beneficiary. It purports
to show that she was the intended party to the release.
Indeed, the case defendant cites, Palmer v. Davisf 808 P. 2d
128 (Utah App. 1991) is an appellate court decision rendered four
years before the Supreme Court decided Child.

Its precedential

value is, therefore, somewhat questionable. See 892 P. 2d at 11, n.
4 (expressly overruling, in part, Krauss v. UDOT, 852 P. 2d 1014

Neither Child nor the case at bar, both of which involve
boilerplate, presents an opportunity to decide what type of
description might be sufficient. Although it is an intriguing
academic exercise, resolving that question here is neither
necessary nor warranted.
7

(Utah App. 1993)).

Additionally, defendant has omitted to discuss

some pertinent aspects of Palmer.
Davis by name.

The release, there, mentioned

See 808 P. 2d at 129,

It reserved plaintiff's

rights against Davis "except as he may be an employee of
released parties]."

.Id..

[the

The court found that it was undisputed

that Davis was an employee.

808 P. 2d at 130.

The third-party

beneficiary discussion was directed to plaintiff's argument that,
as a non-party to the releasey Davis could not be discharged even
if he was an employee.
(B|
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF EXTRIM8IC EVIDENCE
Plaintiff has not argued, here or below, that the release is
ambiguous.

On the contrary, she has maintained that it plainly

discharges only Lowell Jensen, and that there is no ground for
using extrinsic evidence to add to, or change, the names of the
releasee.

Indeed, doing so should be prohibited by § 73-27-42 and

Child, 892 P. 2d 9,

Defendant has sought, to rely upon extrinsic

evidence, albeit without actually arguing that the. release
ambiguous*

This

is

improper,

.See Gordcmr

B20 P. 2d. at

is
493

(ff [ejxtrinsic evidence may be considered only if the agreement is
ambiguous or . . . incomplete,'*). All extrinsic evidence, including
Lancaster's
is

an

supplemental affidavit, is inadmissible unless there

ambiguity.,

Indeed

if. defendant

wants

to

pretend

that

plaintiff is asserting an ambiguity and argue that there is none,
8

then no extrinsic evidence need be considered.

What defendant

cannot do is to deny that the release is ambiguous, yet have
Lancaster's affidavit (and only that evidence) considered.

See

Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285^ 294 (Utah App
1994).
Defendant also asserts, that Ms. Thornock's affidavit "is both
unreliable and irrelevant."

See Appellee's Br., p. 25.

In the

first place, reliability is a matter of credibility, which is for
the jury.

Contrary to Defendant's assertion, the affidavit does

not conflict with the physical existence of the release. Rather,
it contradicts Mr. Lancaster's version of his meeting with Ms.
Thornock.
relating

As far as relevancy is concerned, how can an affidavit
to

irrelevant?

conversations

which

defendant

put

in

issue

be

If Lancaster's version of those events is relevant,

Ms. Thornock's testimony as to the same events must be also.
Plaintiff's

affidavit

is not merely

relevant, but also

sufficient to preclude summary judgment. This is because defendant
—

not plaintiff —

document.

is seeking to modify the plain terms of that

In this regard, defendant's burden is to show that the

parties were in agreement as to the change she seeks.

See Warner

v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Utah App. 1992) ("[t]o reform a
contract, the party claiming mistake must prove ^that the minds of
both parties had been in agreement. . . • ' " ) •
Even if Ms. Thornock's understanding conflicts with some terms
of the agreement, it does not agree with defendant's understanding

(which also conflicts with the terms of the writing) .

It is,

therefore, sufficient to preclude summary judgment predicated upon
changing those terms.

Indeed, as plaintiff has noted, a release

which fails to reflect a meeting of the minds may not even be
valid.

Sea Simonsen v. Travis, 728 P.2d 999 (Utah 193 6)* 2

More-

over, the purpose of parol evidence is to clarify a writing, not to
change it, as defendant would do here. See Brown v. Richards, 840
P.2d 143, 148 (Utah App. 1992),
(C)
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT INJECTED NEW AHGUMEKTH ON APPEAL
Defendant accuses plaintiff of attempting to assert new arguments on appeal, such as fraud, overreaching or lack of capacity.
This is untrue. First, plaintiff has not argued that the judgment
should be reversed for any of these reasons.

She has simply

pointed to facts which might relate to such matters. Second, these
facts were also asserted below —

so there is nothing new here.

Indeed, plaintiff's purpose in discussing these facts here is
precisely the same as it was below. Primarily, they relate to the
meeting between plaintiff and Lancaster, wbicn defendant has put in
issue. Even if the facts raised by plaintiff are not sufficient to

2

Plaintiff has not, as defendant claims, cited this case in an
attempt to invalidate the release. She has cited it to demonstrate
that the path, which defendant must take to modify the release, may
lead to its being invalid.
10

invalidate the release, they are certainly relevant to opposing
defendant's attempts to modify it.
Additionally, the discussion of matters such as fraud or
overreaching serves to put this matter into perspective and to
illustrate the unfairness of defendant's position.

Indeed, it is

the likely insufficiency of these grounds which makes discussing
them all the more pointient. Notwithstanding some rather questionable conduct by Lancaster, it is doubtful that plaintiff could
avoid the release.

She is probably bound by her ill-advised

signature on that document.

The point is, that defendant should

play by the same rules. Defendant should be bound by her insurer's
drafting a release naming only her husband.
V.
CONCLUSION
Under Child, § 78-27-42 precludes a party who is not named in
a release from relying upon it.
here.

That is precisely the situation

The reasons why defendant was not named are irrelevant, as

are her insurer's unilateral intentions.

There is no legal basis

for construing or modifying this release to discharge defendant.
At most, there is a plausible issue as to intent, which is disputed
and cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein and in Appellant's
Brief, the judgment of the court below must be reversed.
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DATED this ^ C
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